Update: felony charges

[thomez]

Originally Posted by ballz2wallz

I agree with both of those

The government shouldn't force me to wear a seatbelt or a lifejacket...I'm not hurting anybody else but myself.

Even if the government didn't make you wear a seatbelt on an airplane.. the airlines would... when you go flying through the air out of your seat during turbulence, it's a big problem

[WickedLou9]

Originally Posted by avsp

can someone confirm that i understand this correctly

the felony is having a gun that could have more than 6 rounds.

the house in question wasnt secure as there was an open window with a jerry-rgged AC unit blocking it.

its believed that the robbers were kids

ballz was unaware of all the laws as some had been passed/changed after he had got his gun licience

The felony is not properly securing the firearms within his house. I believe the law requires you to have them in some sort of safe stored seperately from the ammunition. Because the law defined one of his guns as "large capacity" it was more serious.
The primary offense however was failure to properly store and secure firearms.

[RMNIXON]

Originally Posted by WickedLou9

The felony is not properly securing the firearms within his house. I believe the law requires you to have them in some sort of safe stored seperately from the ammunition. Because the law defined one of his guns as "large capacity" it was more serious.
The primary offense however was failure to properly store and secure firearms.

Well now that has me seriously worried!

With all the murders, break-ins, and and the gang violence taking place in public in Los Angeles County I would hate to think the fate of the poor fool who breaks into a home and must confront the owner of unproperly secured weapons on his own property. What have we failed to do as a society to come to this!

[RMNIXON]

Originally Posted by Donkey®

"locked house" is not secure. There's a reason you keep your money in a bank. "Locked house" is the same as all those "Feel good" security tactics DC throws at us with searches at airports and subways.

How foolish to think we are secure on our own property when the rights of violent felons are so important to our society!

[6SpeedTA95]

at mass

That list donkey posted midaswell have had some BB guns on them, anything bigger than 2mm's is considered large caliber up there


You need to move to Oklahoma bro, you dont have ot put up with that stupid ass shit around here.

[Thorgrim]

. Negligence claim. a. Duty of care, generally. To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care, that the defendant breached this duty, that damage resulted, and that there was a causal relation between the **835 breach of the duty and the damage. See J.R. Nolan & L.J. Sartorio, Tort Law § 11.1 (3d ed.2005). We generally consider the latter three questions--whether a defendant exercised reasonable care, the extent of the damage caused, and whether the defendant's breach and the damage were causally related--to be the special province of the jury. See Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 57-58, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983) (Pine Manor ). However, the existence of a duty is a question of law, and is thus an appropriate subject of summary judgment. See, e.g., Remy v. MacDonald, 440 Mass. 675, 677, 801 N.E.2d 260 (2004) ("If no such duty exists, a claim of negligence cannot be brought").
[8] [9] "The concept of 'duty' ... 'is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of ... considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.... No better general statement can be made than that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable persons would recognize it and agree that it exists.' " Luoni v. Berube, 431 Mass. 729, 735, 729 N.E.2d 1108 (2000), quoting W.L. Prosser & W.P. Keeton, Torts § 53, at 358-359 (5th ed.1984). "The assertion that liability must ... be denied because defendant bears no duty to plaintiff 'begs the essential question--whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct.' " Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal.3d 425, 434, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976), quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 734, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968). "[A] duty finds its 'source in existing social values and customs,' " see Pine Manor, supra at 51, 449 N.E.2d 331, quoting Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244, 247, 435 N.E.2d 339 (1982), and *147 thus "imposition of a duty generally responds to changed social conditions." Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair & Rodeo Ass'n, 177 Ariz. 256, 262, 866 P.2d 1342 (1994).
[10] [11] [12] [13] [14] We have recognized that "[a]s a general principle of tort law, every actor [FN6] has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid physical harm to others." See Remy v. MacDonald, supra at 677, 801 N.E.2d 260, citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 302 comment a (1965). A precondition to this duty is, of course, that the risk of harm to another be recognizable or foreseeable to the actor. See Foley v. Boston Hous. Auth., 407 Mass. 640, 646, 555 N.E.2d 234 (1990), quoting Husband v. Dubose, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 667, 669, 531 N.E.2d 600 (1988) ("There is no duty owed when the risk which results in the plaintiff's injury is not one which could be reasonably anticipated by the defendant"). See also Husband v. Dubose, supra (determination whether person has duty to protect another from harm caused by third party "involve[s], to some extent, the foreseeability of the harm"). Consequently, with some important exceptions, "a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous." Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., supra at 434-435, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334. See Restatement (Second) Torts § 284 (1965) ( "Negligent conduct may be ... an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another ..." **836 [emphasis added] ). "To the extent that a legal standard does exist for determining the existence of a tort duty ..., it is a test of the 'reasonable foreseeability' of the harm." McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 32 Conn. L.Rev. 1189, 1230 (2000) (McClurg). In the instant case, Jupin argues that the theft of the handgun by Jason, and its subsequent use in the killing of a police officer, was a foreseeable consequence of Kask's not ensuring the proper storage of firearms kept on her property, [FN7] and that Kask thus owed the officer a duty of reasonable care. We agree that there *148 was a duty of reasonable care in this case and find no public policy justification for refusing to impose it.


FN6. "The word 'actor' is used in the Restatement ... to describe the person whose conduct is in question as a basis for liability.... It includes, therefore, one whose conduct consists of failure to act as well as one who does act." Restatement (Second) Torts § 314 comment b (1965).



FN7. We acknowledge Jupin's argument that such a question is a factual inquiry better suited for the jury. We note, however, that insofar as foreseeability bears on the existence of a duty, it is not appropriate to leave such an issue to the jury. See, e.g., Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 55, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983) (analyzing foreseeability as part of determination whether duty of care existed). Confusion here is not surprising, as the issue of foreseeability insofar as it affects the causal relationship between the defendant's breach of a duty and the victim's injuries is for the jury to decide.


[15] [16] [17] b. Foreseeability. Although there is a "general proposition that there is no duty to protect others from the criminal or wrongful activities of third persons," see Pine Manor, supra at 50, 449 N.E.2d 331, there are exceptions to this proposition and many situations to which it does not apply. See, e.g., id. ("We conclude that this rule has little application to the circumstances of this case"); Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323, 326-328, 431 N.E.2d 920 (1982) (tavern keeper owes duty toward all drivers not to serve alcohol to intoxicated patron even though vehicle accident caused by patron's criminal act of driving while intoxicated). The Restatement of Torts (Second) explains that "[a]n act or omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm ...." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965). This is true "even though such conduct is criminal." Id. See McClurg, supra at 1231, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B comment e (1965) (reasonable person required to anticipate and guard against criminal misconduct "where the actor's own affirmative act has created or exposed the [victim] to a recognizable high degree of harm through such misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account"). Another section of the Restatement makes clear that a third party's criminal conduct is not unforeseeable if "the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a ... crime." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448 (1965).
We previously discussed the foreseeability of a third party's criminal acts in Pine Manor, supra at 55, 449 N.E.2d 331. That case involved a college student who was raped on her campus by a person who was not part of the college community. Id. at 47, 55, 449 N.E.2d 331. The college*149 argued that it had no duty to protect the student from the criminal act of a third party because, inter alia, "the criminal attack here was not foreseeable." Id. at 54, 449 N.E.2d 331. We rejected this argument for two reasons. First, we concluded it was untenable because of the testimony of a university official who admitted that he had foreseen the risk that a student at Pine Manor could be attacked and raped. Second, we noted that the director of student **837 affairs had "warned students during freshman orientation of the dangers inherent in being housed at a women's college near a metropolitan area," and concluded that "the precautions [this college] and other colleges take to protect their students against criminal acts of third parties would make little sense unless criminal acts were foreseeable." Id. Thus, we determined that "[t]he risk of such a criminal act was not only foreseeable but was actually foreseen." Id.
As in Pine Manor, the risk in the instant case--that a mentally unstable and violent person, to whom unfettered and unsupervised access to Kask's home was granted, would take a gun from that home and shoot someone--was both foreseeable and foreseen. Kask's deposition testimony makes clear that she foresaw the danger of improperly securing the firearms. She conceded that because "a stolen firearm was a dangerous thing to be in the hands of the wrong person," "there would be a corresponding responsibility on those who stored firearms to be sure that they were kept in a way that they would not be at risk of being stolen." She also quite markedly implied that it would be unreasonable to "store something like [a gun]--unless it could be under lock and key in a cabinet." Her testimony leaves the unmistakable impression that she foresaw the risk of a gun being stolen and subsequently used in a criminal act, if it was improperly stored.
At the very least, Kask should have foreseen that Jason--whom she knew had a history of violence, had recent problems with the law, and had been under psychiatric observation--might use his unsupervised access to the house to take a weapon from the basement gun cabinet, and subsequently use this weapon in the commission of a violent crime. [FN8] In a case very similar to this, Estate of Heck v. Stoffer, 786 N.E.2d 265, 269 *150 (Ind.2003), the Supreme Court of Indiana found that two parents owed to a police officer, shot by their adult son, a duty of properly securing firearms stored in their house. In that decision, the son, who had a criminal history and was mentally unstable, no longer lived with his parents, but retained, with their permission, a key to the house. Concluding that its foreseeability analysis "weighs in favor of the establishment of a duty," the court considered "most important" the fact that the son "retained free and unfettered access to his parents' home." Id. The court added that the parents "failed to safeguard the gun from a mentally disturbed, habitual and violent offender with free access to the premises." Id. Cf. McClurg, supra at 1234 (while "[e]xisting case law [from other jurisdictions] on liability for the criminal misuse of stolen guns is split [,] ... almost all of [the cases that have approved liability] involve situations where the assailant who 'stole' the gun was a member of the household where the gun was stored"). We can discern no meaningful distinction--certainly not one regarding the foreseeability of **838 Kask's conduct--between the Estate of Heck decision and the case before us, and agree with that court's analysis. [FN9]


FN8. It is irrelevant whether Kask foresaw or should have foreseen the specific danger that occurred--i.e., that Jason would shoot a police officer during a foot chase. See McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 32 Conn. L.Rev. 1189, 1232 (2000) (McClurg) ("Reasonable foreseeability under tort law does not require the precise sequence of events or manner of injury foreseeable. It
is sufficient that the same general kind of harm was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's risk-creating conduct.... [s]everal courts have specifically recognized that gun thefts and subsequent misuse are foreseeable consequences of negligent storage"). See also Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 454, 245 N.E.2d 420 (1969) ( "specific kind of harm need not be foreseeable as long as it was foreseeable that there would be ... violence towards others").



FN9. We need not and do not decide in this case whether the theft and subsequent criminal use of an improperly stored gun by a person not permitted free access to the home by the owner is objectively foreseeable. Nor do we decide whether sound public policy would countenance imposition of a duty on a homeowner for the same. But see McClurg, supra at 1236 ("Only a handful of courts have addressed this issue.... The results are split, although the 'no liability' cases outnumber the 'pro liability' cases").


c. Public policy. That the harm in this case was reasonably foreseeable or even actually foreseen is persuasive, but not conclusive, of the existence of a duty of care. "There are a limited number of situations ... in which the other legal *151 requirements of negligence may be satisfied, but the imposition of a precautionary duty is deemed to be either inadvisable or unworkable." Remy v. MacDonald, 440 Mass. 675, 677, 801 N.E.2d 260 (2004). We conclude, however, that sound public policy favors imposition of a duty in these circumstances.
[18] A firearm is a dangerous instrumentality. See Sojka v. Dlugosz, 293 Mass. 419, 423, 200 N.E. 554 (1936) (rifle is "highly dangerous instrumentality"). It is beyond question that a heightened amount of care is required of persons dealing with dangerous instrumentalities. See Bennett v. Marquis, 325 Mass. 375, 376, 90 N.E.2d 551 (1950) (defendant's shooting hunting rifle was "handling a dangerous weapon, and ... was bound to use the degree of care commensurate with the serious harm that might follow from the lack of such care"); Restatement (Second) Torts § 298 comment b (1965) ( "those who deal with firearms, explosives, poisonous drugs, or high tension electricity are required to exercise the closest attention and the most careful precautions"). A commonsense corollary to this proposition is that a person with even limited responsibility for or control over a dangerous instrumentality, like a firearm, may, have a duty to exercise care in a situation where no such duty would exist if the instrumentality was not considered highly dangerous. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra at § 318 comment c ("If one in possession of land permits a third person to conduct an activity on it which is highly dangerous unless great care is taken, he may properly be required to exercise constant vigilance to be able to exercise his control ... when and if the occasion for it arises").
In this case, Kask chose to allow a large collection of dangerous instrumentalities (firearms) to remain on her property, and permitted unsupervised access to the same property to a person whom she knew had a history of violence and mental instability. The risk and seriousness of injury that might result from such a person taking a firearm, and thus the costs associated with not recognizing a duty in these circumstances, are high. Accord Irons v. Cole, 46 Conn.Supp. 1, 6, 734 A.2d 1052 (1998) ("Deaths and injuries resulting from use of improperly stored and safeguarded guns are a mounting societal problem."); Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 717 (R.I.2003) ("possessors of residential property would have carte blanche to allow third-party users of their *152 property ... to engage in such inherently dangerous activities as possessing guns ... on the possessors' property, and thereby needlessly exposing their neighbors and other innocent parties to wrack and ruin, let alone bodily injury and death").
On the other hand, the costs of imposing the duty sought here--both the financial costs of ensuring the proper securing of firearms and the more esoteric costs involved with requiring certain actions to **839 relieve potential liability--are modest. In the present case, Kask's burden was not a financial one. She simply was required to take reasonable care to ensure that the guns stored on her property were either secured and not accessible to Jason, or were removed. Indeed, a jury might well find that Kask adequately performed her duty of care by ensuring that Rivers built a locked gun cabinet in which to store the guns.
This is not a case in which recognizing a duty would expose a property owner to endless liability and litigation from or for the acts of innumerable persons who briefly entered the owner's premises. Contrast Luoni v. Berube, 431 Mass. 729, 734, 729 N.E.2d 1108 (2000) (concluding host had no duty to third person injured by party guest's use of fireworks that he brought onto owner's land without her knowledge because such duty would lead to "considerable litigation, with plaintiffs claiming that social hosts should have supervised guests who misused alcohol, not furnished by hosts, set off fireworks, not provided by the hosts, played dangerous games, engaged in horseplay around swimming pools, and so forth"). The imposition of a duty in the instant case is predicated on the affirmative permission Kask gave Rivers to store firearms on her property for an extended period of time, knowing that an unstable and violent person had regular and unsupervised access to the property. Ordinarily, the number of persons who live with a property owner and store such dangerous instrumentalities in common space are vastly smaller than the number of guests who enter the premises for a party or some other short term-event. And the property owner certainly has more of an interest in learning of, and more time to accept or reject, an item kept on her premises by longer-term guests. Contrast id. at 734 n. 5, 729 N.E.2d 1108 ("We reject the plaintiff's claim that the defendant ... by watching the fireworks, gave tacit approval for their use, and so effectively had control over the situation....")
*153 Moreover, this is not a case where the homeowner is required to control the actual use of property that a third person has brought into the home. Contrast Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 411 Mass. 401, 406, 582 N.E.2d 954 (1991) ("The ability effectively to control a guest's excessive drinking is not present when the liquor belongs to the guest"). The duty contemplated in this case is one of ensuring that, where a property owner has agreed to permit firearms to be stored on her property in a location used by both her and the owner of the firearms, the firearms are secure and not accessible to others who also have been granted unfettered access to the home and might make improper use of them. [FN10]


FN10. We have previously held landowners responsible for a third party's storage of items in an area controlled--exclusively or coextensively--by the landowner. See Ross v. Broitman, 338 Mass. 770, 771, 157 N.E.2d 532 (1959) (landowner can be found negligent where fire was intensified because tenant kept "large accumulation of paper and cardboard ... in the first floor common hallway ... which was in the
control of the defendant, had been in plain view and known to the defendant for some weeks or months"). See also Chalfen v. Kraft, 324 Mass. 1, 4, 84 N.E.2d 454 (1949) (landowner negligent for fire started by cigarette thrown onto papers that accumulated in cellar where "defendant had the possession and control [of the area] which normally accompany ownership").


This is not a case where recognition of a duty would open the door to liability for almost all actions or omissions by the defendant. Contrast Remy v. MacDonald, 440 Mass. 675, 677-678, 801 N.E.2d 260 (2004) (because almost "all aspects of a woman's life may have an impact, for better or worse, on her developing fetus," imposing duty on pregnant woman not to **840 harm fetus negligently would present almost unlimited number of circumstances where liability could attach). Here, the duty is limited to a property owner's voluntary and substantial (long-term) connection to a dangerous instrumentality.
We are persuaded that there is a significant social benefit to be realized by recognizing a duty of the person in control of the premises to exercise due care with regard to the storage of guns on the premises, particularly with respect to those who have been granted regular access to it. Volpe v. Gallagher, supra at 717, quoting Irons v. Cole, supra at 6, 734 A.2d 1052. Our conclusion is consistent with legislative enactments acknowledging that the unauthorized use of firearms is a significant problem and placing requirements on owners of guns for the purpose of preventing their use by persons not competent to use them. See *154 Commonwealth v. Parzick, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 846, 849, 835 N.E.2d 1171 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Lee, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 518, 523, 409 N.E.2d 1311 (1980), and Ruggiero v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 256, 258, 464 N.E.2d 104 (1984) ("statutory scheme governing gun control evidences a legislative purpose 'to prevent the temptation and the ability to use firearms to inflict harm, be it negligently or intentionally, on another or on oneself.' ... '[T]he goal of firearms control legislation in Massachusetts is to limit access to deadly weapons by irresponsible persons' and the Legislature has adopted a wide range of methods 'to accomplish this goal, including ... the imposition of serious penalties for infractions of the firearms control laws' "). These enactments include a measure requiring gun owners to ensure that the firearms they own are "secured in a locked container" when stored. See G.L. c. 140, § 131L (a ) ("It shall be unlawful to store or keep any firearm ... in any place unless such weapon is secured in a locked container or equipped with a tamper-resistant mechanical lock or other safety device, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inoperable by any person other than the owner or other lawfully authorized user. For purposes of this section, such weapon shall not be deemed stored or kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or other lawfully authorized user"). While this statutory provision does not create a duty on the part of persons who are neither gun owners nor lawfully authorized users, it is illustrative of the societal concern with weapons reaching the hands of unauthorized users. Accord Stoelting v. Hauck, 32 N.J. 87, 96, 159 A.2d 385 (1960) ("Firearms have been a subject of legislative control, which indicates a recognition of damage which may ensue from the use of a dangerous instrument, especially in incompetent or unqualified hands").
"The evolution of the law of negligence has always required courts to make hard (and fine) distinctions...." Cyran v. Ware, 413 Mass. 452, 460, 597 N.E.2d 1352 (1992). None of our previous cases concerning landowner negligence for the use of a firearm by a third party is controlling in the factual situation presented here. See, e.g., Sabatinelli v. Butler, 363 Mass. 565, 296 N.E.2d 190 (1973) (father not negligent for failing to control son's misuse of his own firearm where father did not know of son's record of misuse of firearms); *155 Sojka v. Dlugosz, 293 Mass. 419, 200 N.E. 554 (1936) (whether father negligent for letting sons use his rifle); Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N.E. 334 (1928) (whether parents who knew child possessed handgun negligent for not taking it away); Souza v. Irome, 219 Mass. 273, 106 N.E. 998 (1914) (father negligent for permitting his son to have gun). And cases most similar to the present one, **841 Andrade v. Baptiste, 411 Mass. 560, 583 N.E.2d 837 (1992), [FN11] and McDonald v. Lavery, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 1108, 534 N.E.2d 1190 (1989), [FN12] do not foreclose the conclusion we reach today.


FN11. Andrade v. Baptiste, 411 Mass. 560, 583 N.E.2d 837 (1992), primarily concerned the use, not storage, of a firearm by the gun owner himself. Because the defendant "had no legal ability ... to control her husband's misuse of his own property," she "therefore, [had] no accompanying duty" to do so. Id. at 563, 583 N.E.2d 837. Put more aptly, even if the defendant had required the husband to store or safeguard his firearm in some other way than he did, she had no capacity to prevent him from retrieving and using his firearm, and thus to impose a duty to do so would be improper. See id. at 564-565, 583 N.E.2d 837 (referencing McDonald v. Lavery, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 1108, 534 N.E.2d 1190 [1989], and concluding that "in the parent-child relationship, liability has not been imposed on facts similar to those here even though parents arguably are able to exercise even more control over their child than a wife can assert over her husband").



FN12. McDonald v. Lavery, supra, did not address a negligent storage claim. Rather, the plaintiff in that case asserted that the defendant was negligent for failing "adequately to supervise and control"
their adult son while he resided with them. Id. at 1108, 534 N.E.2d 1190. The son used his own rifle to shoot a friend after a night of drinking. The question was whether the fact that their son lived with the defendants or that they were his parents "impose[d] on [them] the duty to supervise and control" him. Id. at 1110, 534 N.E.2d 1190, quoting Alioto v. Marnell, 402 Mass. 36, 39, 520 N.E.2d 1284 (1988). The Appeals Court concluded that there was no such duty in the circumstances of the case.


Kask nonetheless points to the court's discussion in the Andrade decision regarding the inapplicability of the Restatement (Second) Torts, supra at § 318. [FN13] In Andrade v. Baptiste, supra at 562, 583 N.E.2d 837, the plaintiff argued that defendant, "as sole owner of the marital home, owed a duty ... to prevent [her husband] from storing the rifle ... on her property." The plaintiff "reason[ed] from the principles in § 318 that the defendant 'could have *156 required [her husband] to install locks on the ... storage areas, refused to permit ... assault weapons to be stored on the premises, or exercised numerous other measures of control to prevent him from having easy ... access to a deadly weapon ... [including] ... insis[ting] that [her husband] move out.' " Id. While Kask is correct that we found § 318's principles inapplicable, we did so because we concluded that the husband's use of his own gun (to shoot an employee of a neighboring store) was not the "use of [the defendant's] property ... in the sense contemplated by § 318." Id. at 563, 583 N.E.2d 837. The circumstances in this case, however, and particularly the use of the Kask home for the storage of a collection of guns, bring it much closer to what § 318 contemplates.


FN13. That section states: "If the actor permits a third person to use land or chattels in his possession otherwise than as a servant, he is, if present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the actor (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the third person, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control." Restatement (Second) Torts § 318 (1965).


Even if this case would not fit precisely under the rubric of § 318, that section is consistent with our conclusion that the duty we impose today is not in irreconcilable tension with "the general rule that 'a landowner has [no] duty to protect another from intentional criminal acts of third parties which take place on ... the public way.' " Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 715 (R.I.2003), quoting Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 686 (R.I.1994). Rather, this duty is one of a number of limited exceptions **842 to that general rule, where both the doctrine of foreseeability and sound public policy counsel an alternative conclusion. In consideration of emerging social customs and values, as well as appropriate social policy, we hold that a homeowner who permits a guest to keep guns permanently on her premises and allows a third person with a criminal history and mental difficulties unsupervised access to the property, has a duty to ensure that the firearms are properly and safely stored. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment on this claim and remand the case for further action.
4. Strict liability and public nuisance claims. In addition to pressing a claim against Kask for negligence, Jupin asserted that Kask should be held strictly liable for any harm resulting from the use of the firearms she allowed to be kept on her property, and that the improper storage of the firearms (even though unloaded) constituted a public nuisance, giving rise to her liability for any harm resulting therefrom. The judge granted Kask's motion for summary judgment on both of these counts.
*157 In support of strict liability, Jupin argued that the firearm taken by Jason from Kask'sant's property was a dangerous instrumentality and that "one who for his own benefit keeps a dangerous instrumentality should be liable per se for [the natural consequences of] its escape," which in this case was the murder of Officer Jupin. See Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 367 Mass. 70, 86, 323 N.E.2d 876 (1975). The judge concluded that strict liability did not apply on these facts because Officer Jupin's injuries were not the direct consequence of the alleged improper storage of the gun. Cf. O'Connor v. E.J. DiCarlo & Sons, 376 Mass. 927, 927-928, 378 N.E.2d 695 (1978) (denying plaintiffs' damage "caused ... by tremors occasioned by [defendant's] blasting" because tremors did not constitute direct consequence of abnormally dangerous activity). He added that the damage in this case was not a natural consequence of the alleged improper storage of the firearm, but was caused by an intervening act of a third party.
[19] Jupin concedes that "there is no Massachusetts case imposing strict liability for the unsafe storage of firearms." Indeed, we are not aware of, and have not been pointed to, any jurisdiction that imposes such liability on similar facts. Even were this not so, we would not conclude that the storage of firearms in the circumstances of this case creates strict liability for the owner of the premises in which the firearms are stored. This is because such storage is "neither ultrahazardous nor extraordinary." Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., supra at 84, 323 N.E.2d 876. See United Elec. Light Co. v. Deliso Constr. Co., 315 Mass. 313, 321-322, 52 N.E.2d 553 (1943), quoting Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 399, 62 N.E. 746 (1902) ("The application of the doctrine [of strict liability] ... has been limited in this Commonwealth 'to such unusual and extraordinary uses of property in reference to the benefits to be derived from the use and the *158 dangers or losses to which others are exposed, as should not be permitted except at the sole risk of the user' "); Fibre Leather Mfg. Corp. v. Ramsay Mills, Inc., 329 Mass. 575, 577, 109 N.E.2d 910 (1952), quoting Ainsworth v. Lakin, supra at 400- 401, 62 N.E. 746 (strict liability "applies to unusual and extraordinary uses [of land] which are so fraught with peril to others that the owner should not be permitted to adopt them for his own purposes without absolutely protecting his neighbors from injury or loss by reason of the use"). [FN14], [FN15]


FN14. That we consider guns to be dangerous instrumentalities requiring a heightened degree of care does not automatically mean that storage of such guns qualifies as an ultrahazardous or extraordinary use for strict liability treatment. Accord Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., 9 Cal.App.4th 88, 116, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 (1992) ("Even though firearm use or possession has not been elevated to an ultrahazardous activity resulting in the imposition of absolute liability, civil laws hold firearm use or possession to the highest standard of due care. Even a slight deviation from this standard in the use or possession of a firearm may constitute actionable negligence").



FN15. Even if we expanded strict liability to the storage of other person's firearms on one's property, Jason's theft of the gun with which he shot Officer Jupin would relieve Kask of liability under this theory. See Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 367 Mass. 70, 90 n. 21, 323 N.E.2d 876 (1975) ("In cases where the doctrine of strict liability would otherwise be applicable on the facts, the defendant can avoid liability by showing that the 'escape' was caused by an ... intervening unlawful act of a third person").


**843 In support of her theory of public nuisance, Jupin argued that Kask's improper storage of the firearms in her home interfered with public health, morals, and safety, and that this interference was a result of Kask's "negligent, reckless, and ultrahazardous" conduct. Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher, 387 Mass. 889, 891 n. 2, 444 N.E.2d 368 (1983). The judge first noted the vast gap between this case and traditional public nuisance cases, such as "those involving highways and navigable streams" or "the keeping of diseased animals or the maintenance of a pond breeding malarial mosquitos." He then noted that "[p]roperty owners are permitted to store firearms in their homes." Finally, he concluded that "[t]o hold that the storage of firearms constitutes a public nuisance" would be "inappropriate."
[20] [21] Jupin cites no authority from any jurisdiction applying a public nuisance theory to the ownership, possession, or storage of a firearm. We decline to take such a novel step. [FN16] The storage of legally acquired firearms in a home is not among nor analogous to "guidelines as to what is covered by traditional [public nuisance] doctrine." Leary v. Boston, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 605, 609-610 & n. 6, 481 N.E.2d 1184 (1985), quoting *159 Restatement (Second) Torts § 821B comment b (1979) ("At common law public nuisance came to cover a large ... group of minor criminal offenses, all of which involved some interference with the interests of the community at large--interests that were recognized as rights of the general public entitled to protection. Thus public nuisances included interference with the public health, as in the case of keeping diseased animals or the maintenance of a pond breeding malarial mosquitoes; with the public safety, as in the case of the storage of explosives in the midst of a city or the shooting of fireworks in the public streets; with the public morals, as in the case of houses of prostitution or indecent exhibitions; with the public peace, as by loud and disturbing noises; with the public comfort, as in the case of widely disseminated bad odors, dust and smoke; [and] with the public convenience, as by the obstruction of a public highway or a navigable stream ..."). Quite evidently, the instant case comes closest to the traditional interference with public safety by way of storing explosives in the midst of a city. However, where explosives stored in the middle of a city create a public nuisance because they might simply go off, causing loss of life outside the property on which they are **844 stored, unloaded firearms do not possess the same capabilities. Cf. Leary v. Boston, supra at 610, 481 N.E.2d 1184 ("keeping of diseased animals or the maintenance of a pond breeding malarial mosquitoes adversely affects members of the public whether or not they are on the subject property"). Unloaded firearms do not, in and of themselves, discharge. Thus, they do not inherently interfere with or threaten the public safety and are not appropriately considered a public nuisance. [FN17] Any injury to the public in the circumstances of this case was not the result of the allegedly improper storage (however characterized), but of the theft and use of the gun by a third party. Whatever public nuisance might have existed with reference to the murder of Officer Jupin was not the result of Kask's conduct.


FN16. We do not today foreclose the possibility that some far more egregious conduct with respect to firearms might constitute a public nuisance. We do hold, however, that the home storage of unloaded, legally purchased and owned firearms, even in a poorly locked gun cabinet, does not constitute a public nuisance.



FN17. The decision of the judge below could be read to rely on an
inaccurate assumption--that the gun cabinet was securely locked--or at least, that Kask was not negligent in failing to discover otherwise. However, we may affirm the grant of summary judgment on any ground apparent from the summary judgment record.


5. Conclusion. Because we conclude that the doctrines of *160 strict liability and public nuisance are inapplicable to the storage of unloaded firearms in a private home in the circumstances here presented, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on those two counts. However, because we conclude that the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff relative to the storage of firearms kept in her home, to which a mentally unstable and violent person was given unsupervised access, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on that count.
So ordered.
Mass.,2006.
Jupin v. Kask
447 Mass. 141, 849 N.E.2d 829

[Thorgrim]

A jury found the defendant, Stephen Parzick, guilty of improper storage of a firearm in violation of G.L. c. 140, § 131L, and possession of a firearm without a valid firearm identification (FID) card, in violation of G.L. c. 269, § 10( h ). In his appeal, the defendant contends that guns stored in an unlocked bedroom closet within a locked bedroom are “ secured *847 in a locked container,” as required by G.L. c. 140, § 131L. He also claims that (1) the licensing authority's failure to notify him of the denial of his license renewal application entitled him to assume that his expired license remained valid; (2) G.L. c. 140, § 129B(12), does not provide an affirmative defense, but rather puts the burden on the Commonwealth to prove that his expired license was not valid and (3) the trial judge erred in failing to give a requested instruction that the law requires an applicant for an FID card to be notified in writing of the denial of his application. We affirm.

[1] Summary of facts and proceedings. At trial, the defendant filed motions for required findings of not guilty both at the close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all of the evidence. In our review of the denial of his motions for required findings of not guilty, we determine whether the evidence, viewed “together with permissible inferences from that evidence [and] in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,” was sufficient to satisfy the jury that all of the essential elements of the crime existed beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 400, 798 N.E.2d 1005 (2003). “The relevant question is whether the evidence would permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires such a finding.” Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 312, 597 N.E.2d 36 (1992), quoting from Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747, 519 N.E.2d 1291 (1988).

The defendant was friends with Debra Mayernik and her husband, both of whom worked for him in exchange for lodging in his home. Mayernik's son, seventeen year old Stephen Fish, also came to live in the house. The defendant did not permit Fish, who had his own bedroom, to be **1174 alone in the house or to have access to any bedroom other than his own. The defendant was home on August 19, 2001, when he discovered that several rifles he owned (as well as other items of value) were missing from his bedroom closet where he stored them, leaning against the wall in the corner behind his clothes. The closet was not equipped with a lock. When he was not at home, the defendant barricaded the closet door with boxes and other items and locked his bedroom door. That door was fitted with a knob lock that could be locked from inside the room. Mayernik had an identical lock on her bedroom door, which she opened from the outside by inserting a bobby pin into the hole in the knob.

*848 The defendant told Fish's mother of the theft, and she immediately called the police. One of the responding officers accompanied the defendant into his bedroom to determine how many guns were stolen. Upon observing where the guns were kept, the officer informed the defendant that his firearms were improperly stored as they did not have trigger locks and were not stored in a “gun-securing cabinet” or in a properly secured room. Fish returned home during the investigation and admitted to the theft of the guns.

Asked by the officers whether he had an FID card, the defendant said he did, but had not picked it up from the police station. Because his FID card had expired, the defendant had applied for a new card on January 5, 2000, some nineteen months before the date he discovered that his guns were stolen. He had received a cancelled check for this application fee. There was testimony from the officer in charge of processing firearms license applications that the defendant's application had been denied at some point, but written notice of the denial had not been sent to the defendant. There was no evidence of the date of the denial, but as of August 19, 2001, the date of the offense, the defendant had not received notice of denial and had not inquired about the status of his application.

Discussion. 1. Improper storage of a firearm. The defendant argues that his bedroom was a container within the meaning of G.L. c. 140, § 131L, and that he was not in violation of the statute because the bedroom door was locked. The defendant's interpretation of the statute ignores the requirement that a container must not only be “locked” but also “secure.” Section 131L, inserted by St.1998, c. 180, § 47, provides in relevant part as follows:

“( a ) It shall be unlawful to store or keep any firearm ... in any place unless such weapon is secured in a locked container or equipped with a tamper-resistant mechanical lock or other safety device, properly engaged so as to render such weapon inoperable by any person other than the owner ...” (emphasis added).FN1


FN1. None of the defendant's guns was so equipped.


[2] [3] The phrase “secured in a locked container” is not defined by *849 the statute.FN2 “When a statute does not define its words we give them their usual and accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose.” **1175 Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369, 361 N.E.2d 1239 (1977). The Legislature's intent may be ascertained “from all [the statute's] words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished.” Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 640, 738 N.E.2d 731 (2000), quoting from Champagne v. Champagne, 429 Mass. 324, 326, 708 N.E.2d 100 (1999).


FN2. Although our courts have not interpreted the phrase “secured in a locked container,” we have said that the “usual and natural meaning” of “a container is ‘a receptacle (as a box or jar) or a formed or flexible covering for the packing or shipment of articles, goods or commodities' ... ; and a receptacle is ‘one that receives and contains something.’ ” Commonwealth v. Lee, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 518, 523 n. 3, 409 N.E.2d 1311 (1980), quoting from Webster's Third New Intl. Dictionary 491, 1894 (1971). We assume, without deciding, that a bedroom may constitute a container for purposes of the statute.


[4] Read in its entirety, the statutory scheme governing gun control evinces a legislative purpose “to prevent the temptation and the ability to use firearms to inflict harm, be it negligently or intentionally, on another or on oneself.” Commonwealth v. Lee, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 518, 523, 409 N.E.2d 1311 (1980). As we have had occasion to observe, “[t]he goal of firearms control legislation in Massachusetts is to limit access to deadly weapons by irresponsible persons” and the Legislature has adopted a wide range of methods “to accomplish this goal, including ... the imposition of serious penalties for infractions of the firearms control laws.” Ruggiero v. Police Commr. of Boston, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 256, 258, 464 N.E.2d 104 (1984). We note as well that G.L. c. 140, § 123, inserted by St.1998, c. 180, § 19, requires firearms dealers to give written warning to gun purchasers and to “conspicuously post at each purchase counter ... in bold type not less than one inch in height [the following]: ‘IT IS UNLAWFUL TO STORE OR KEEP A FIREARM, RIFLE, SHOTGUN OR MACHINE GUN IN ANY PLACE UNLESS THAT WEAPON IS EQUIPPED WITH A TAMPER-RESISTANT SAFETY DEVICE OR IS STORED OR KEPT IN A SECURELY LOCKED CONTAINER ’ ” (emphasis added).

*850 The use of the word “secured” in G.L. c. 140, § 131L, comports with its use in G.L. c. 140, § 123, and indicates that the container must not merely be locked, but securely locked. See Commonwealth v. Lee, 10 Mass.App.Ct. at 522, 409 N.E.2d 1311, quoting from Libby v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 273 Mass. 522, 525-526, 174 N.E. 171 (1930) (statute is to be interpreted so that “no clause, sentence or word shall prove superfluous, void or insignificant if by any other construction it may be made useful and pertinent”). The Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. Wilchinski, 242 Conn. 211, 700 A.2d 1 (1997), interpreting a similar statute,FN3 defined the word “secure” to mean “to ‘hold fast,’ to ‘tie down,’ to ‘put beyond hazard of losing,’ or ‘inviolable,’ ” as well as “to relieve from exposure to danger.” Id. at 224-225, 700 A.2d 1, quoting from Webster's Third New Intl. Dictionary 2053 (1963). That court concluded that the only logical definition of “secure” in the context of the statute was “one that focuses both on preventing minors from gaining access to guns and on preventing them from being able to misuse the weapon.” Id. at 225, 700 A.2d 1.


FN3. Connecticut Gen.Stat. § 29-37i (2003) provides in pertinent part as follows: “No person shall store or keep any loaded firearm on any premises under his control if he knows or reasonably should know that a minor is likely to gain access to the firearm ... unless such person (1) keeps the firearm in a securely locked box or other container or in a location which a reasonable person would believe to be secure....”


[5] We likewise conclude that G.L. c. 140, § 131L, requires guns to be maintained in locked containers in a way that will deter all but the most persistent from gaining access. Even a door locked with a key is not secure if the key is hanging next to the lock. Assuming the defendant's bedroom to be a container, and further **1176 that it was locked at the time of the theft, FN4 the defendant was in violation of G.L. c. 140, § 131L, because the lock was easily defeated by anyone with access to a bobby pin and did not prevent ready access by anyone other than the lawful owner. Because the evidence supports a finding that the *851 room was not a securely locked container, denial of the defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty was proper.


FN4. We think the jury might have inferred from the evidence that the defendant, who testified that he locked the bedroom door when he was not at home, was at home when Fish took the guns. The defendant also testified that he had informed his insurance company that he did not see any sign of forced entry and that he assumed that Fish had simply walked into the bedroom to steal the guns. The conviction might have been upheld on the ground that the room was not locked. Because it was not argued, we do not base our decision on this view of the facts.


[6] [7] [8] 2. Invalid FID card. “[A] qualified individual may lawfully possess a firearm” if he has obtained an FID card or is exempt from this requirement. Commonwealth v. Morse, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 426, 428, 425 N.E.2d 769 (1981). Under the law of the Commonwealth, the “[a]bsence of a license is not an ‘element of the crime’ ” of possessing or carrying a firearm in violation of G.L. c. 269, § 10( h ). Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406, 361 N.E.2d 1308 (1977). See Commonwealth v. Farley, 64 Mass.App.Ct. 854, 860-862, 835 N.E.2d 1159 (2005). See also G.L. c. 278, § 7 (“A defendant in a criminal prosecution, relying for his justification upon a license ... or authority, shall prove the same; and, until so proved, the presumption shall be that he is not so authorized”). The burden is thus on a defendant to come forward with evidence that he possesses a valid license. Until he does, the presumption remains in effect that he was not licensed and “no issue is presented with respect to licensing.” Commonwealth v. Jones, supra.

We reject the defendant's contention that it was the Commonwealth's burden, pursuant to G. L. c. 140, 129B(12), ‘to disprove (the defendant's) entitlement to an FID card at the time of the incident.‘ General Laws c. 140, s 129B(12), inserted by St. 1998, c. 180, s 29, as in effect on the date of the offense provides, in pertinent part: ‘Notwithstanding thos provisions of section 10 of chapter 269, any person in possession of a non-large capacity rifle or shotgun whose firearm identification card issued under this section is invalid for the sole reason that is has expired, but who shall not be disqualified from renewal upon application therefor under this section, shall be subject to a civil fine..... and the provisions of said section 10 of said chapter 269 shall not apply.....‘ This statute does not alter the Commonwealth's burden nor change the elements of the crime of which the defendant was charged. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. at 406. Rather, s 129B(12) provides an affirmative defense to the criminal charge of possession of a firearm without a valid FID card; as *852 such, it is only when a defendant has produced evidence sufficient to raise the affimative defense that it becomes the ‘Commonwealth's burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense was unavailable to the defendant.‘ Commonwealth v. Farley, supra. at 862 (construing similar language in G.L. c. 140, s 131(m)). The defendant makes no claim that he produced evident sufficient to raise the affirmative defense.

The defendant further argues that he reasonably relied on a cancelled check to act as a substitute for an FID card in the absence of written notice that his license had been denied.


“(5) Any applicant or holder aggrieved by a denial, revocation or suspension of a firearm identification card ... may, within either 90 days after receipt of notice of such denial, revocation or suspension or within 90 days after the expiration of the time limit in which the licensing authority is required to respond to the applicant, file a petition to obtain judicial review....”

This provision contains no presumption that a valid license is in effect pending issuance or denial. In its place, the applicant is entitled to obtain judicial review after the passage of the forty-day period, if no notice has been given as required.


**1177 We also reject the defendant's claim that evidence to convict was lacking because the failure to give him notice of the denial of his application establishes that he did not have the “mens rea” required for the offense under G.L. c. 269, § 10( h ). The denial of his application was not an essential element of the *853 crime that the Commonwealth was required to prove. Commonwealth v. Hampton, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 938, 940, 525 N.E.2d 1341 (1988) ( “[T]here is nothing in the statute or case law that states that knowledge of the suspension of the license to carry firearms is an essential element of the crime to be proved by the Commonwealth”). See McQuoid v. Smith, 556 F.2d 595, 598 (1st Cir.1977) (“To convict under section 10 ( [ h ] ), it need not be shown that the accused knew of the necessity of a license [or] that he possessed criminal scienter ...” [emphasis omitted] ). FN6


FN6. Because we conclude that the defendant's lack of knowledge that his application had been denied does not constitute a defense to the charge of possession of a firearm without a valid FID card in violation of G.L. c. 269, § 10( h ), we also reject his claim that the trial judge improperly refused to give a requested jury instruction that it is the licensing authority's obligation, under G.L. c. 140, § 129B(3), to notify applicants in writing of the denial of their application for an FID card.


[9] [10] The defendant's next claim is based on G.L. c. 140, § 129B(12), which, subject to enumerated exceptions, provides an affirmative defense to those found in possession of a firearm “whose firearm identification card issued under this section is invalid for the sole reason that it has expired.” FN7 We need not analyze whether the defendant met his initial burden with sufficient evidence such that the Commonwealth was required to disprove the availability of the affirmative defense. See Commonwealth v. Farley, supra. The defendant makes this claim for the first time on appeal, and he has, therefore, waived it. Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 293, 780 N.E.2d 58 (2002). In any case, as the Commonwealth notes, in order to raise an affirmative defense based upon a claim of license, the defendant was required by Mass.R.Crim.P. 14(b)(3), 378 Mass. 874 (1979), to “notify the prosecutor in writing of such intention.” “Failure to do so renders the claim [of license] unavailable as a defense.” Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 438 Mass. 658, 665, 783 N.E.2d 417 (2003).


FN7. General Laws c. 140, § 129B(12), inserted by St.1998, c. 180, § 29, as in effect on the date of the offense, provides, in pertinent part:

“Notwithstanding the provision of section 10 of chapter 269, any person in possession of a non-large capacity rifle or shotgun whose firearm identification card issued under this section is invalid for the sole reason that it has expired, but who shall not be disqualified from renewal upon application therefor under his section, shall be subject to a civil fine ... and the provisions of said section 10 of chapter 269 shall not apply....”


Judgments affirmed.

Mass.App.Ct.,2005.
Com. v. Parzick
64 Mass.App.Ct. 846, 835 N.E.2d 1171

[Thorgrim]

First case's opinion was written by Republican appointee:
Honorable Robert J. Cordy, Associate Justice, was born in Manchester, Connecticut, on May 18, 1949. He received his A.B. degree from Dartmouth College in 1971, and his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1974. Justice Cordy began his legal career in 1974 as a defense attorney for the Massachusetts Defenders Committee. From 1978 to 1979, he worked for the Department of Revenue, where he was a Special Assistant Attorney General. From 1979 to 1982, he was Associate General Counsel in Charge of Enforcement at the State Ethics Commission. From 1982 to 1987, Justice Cordy served as a federal prosecutor under then U.S. Attorney William F. Weld. While in that office, he became Chief of the Public Corruption Unit. He was a partner in the law firm of Burns & Levinson in Boston from 1987 to 1991. From 1991 to 1993, he served as Chief Legal Counsel to then Governor Weld. In 1993, Justice Cordy joined the Boston office of the international law firm of McDermott, Will & Emery, where he became Managing Partner. In addition to his other positions, he was a lecturer at Harvard Law School from 1987 to 1996. He was appointed an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court in February, 2001 by Governor Paul Cellucci


Second case posted was written by an Asian American who, again, was appointed by a Republican:
Harvard University Law School, Cambridge, MA, 1978
J.D., Doctor of Jurisprudence

If anyone wants to actually talk about how stupid the legal system in MA is...why don't you actually look at those two cases and show us all how stupid these republican appointed judges are...

[Simius]

I'll say what I said in the other thread: That sucks, dude. I hope it all works out for you and at most you get a fine and a stiff lawyer fee.

[Stylerod]

Originally Posted by Thorgrim

If anyone wants to actually talk about how stupid the legal system in MA is...why don't you actually look at those two cases and show us all how stupid these republican appointed judges are...

So are you saying the judges are stupid because they are republican? Or we should all just not give our opinion because a republican judge judged a case based on MA law? I have no idea what your point here is.

Most everyone here thinks it's a bad law no matter what the party affiliation.

Sure, I'll talk about the idiots that created this law to punish non-criminals that want to enjoy their 2nd amendment rights. Hell, they are probably spending more time on Ballz then they are trying to find the people who stole his stuff. And that is a fucking shame.

[Thorgrim]

No to your first "question"

I'm merely saying these are republican appointed-judges interpretting the law in a way that would seem to outrage most of you...a locked house is not a secure container, etc

So, go through the MA opinions of GOP judges who ha