A War We Might Win *nytimes op/ed*

[kinggovernor]

A War We Just Might Win
By MICHAEL E. O’HANLON and KENNETH M. POLLACK
Washington

VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration’s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place.

Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.

After the furnace-like heat, the first thing you notice when you land in Baghdad is the morale of our troops. In previous trips to Iraq we often found American troops angry and frustrated — many sensed they had the wrong strategy, were using the wrong tactics and were risking their lives in pursuit of an approach that could not work.

Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.

Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services — electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation — to the people. Yet in each place, operations had been appropriately tailored to the specific needs of the community. As a result, civilian fatality rates are down roughly a third since the surge began — though they remain very high, underscoring how much more still needs to be done.

In Ramadi, for example, we talked with an outstanding Marine captain whose company was living in harmony in a complex with a (largely Sunni) Iraqi police company and a (largely Shiite) Iraqi Army unit. He and his men had built an Arab-style living room, where he met with the local Sunni sheiks — all formerly allies of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups — who were now competing to secure his friendship.

In Baghdad’s Ghazaliya neighborhood, which has seen some of the worst sectarian combat, we walked a street slowly coming back to life with stores and shoppers. The Sunni residents were unhappy with the nearby police checkpoint, where Shiite officers reportedly abused them, but they seemed genuinely happy with the American soldiers and a mostly Kurdish Iraqi Army company patrolling the street. The local Sunni militia even had agreed to confine itself to its compound once the Americans and Iraqi units arrived.

We traveled to the northern cities of Tal Afar and Mosul. This is an ethnically rich area, with large numbers of Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. American troop levels in both cities now number only in the hundreds because the Iraqis have stepped up to the plate. Reliable police officers man the checkpoints in the cities, while Iraqi Army troops cover the countryside. A local mayor told us his greatest fear was an overly rapid American departure from Iraq. All across the country, the dependability of Iraqi security forces over the long term remains a major question mark.

But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed. The American high command assesses that more than three-quarters of the Iraqi Army battalion commanders in Baghdad are now reliable partners (at least for as long as American forces remain in Iraq).

In addition, far more Iraqi units are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Iraqi Army’s highly effective Third Infantry Division started out as overwhelmingly Kurdish in 2005. Today, it is 45 percent Shiite, 28 percent Kurdish, and 27 percent Sunni Arab.

In the past, few Iraqi units could do more than provide a few “jundis” (soldiers) to put a thin Iraqi face on largely American operations. Today, in only a few sectors did we find American commanders complaining that their Iraqi formations were useless — something that was the rule, not the exception, on a previous trip to Iraq in late 2005.

The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus’s determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave.

In war, sometimes it’s important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

These groups have tried to impose Shariah law, brutalized average Iraqis to keep them in line, killed important local leaders and seized young women to marry off to their loyalists. The result has been that in the last six months Iraqis have begun to turn on the extremists and turn to the Americans for security and help. The most important and best-known example of this is in Anbar Province, which in less than six months has gone from the worst part of Iraq to the best (outside the Kurdish areas). Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor.

Another surprise was how well the coalition’s new Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working. Wherever we found a fully staffed team, we also found local Iraqi leaders and businessmen cooperating with it to revive the local economy and build new political structures. Although much more needs to be done to create jobs, a new emphasis on microloans and small-scale projects was having some success where the previous aid programs often built white elephants.

In some places where we have failed to provide the civilian manpower to fill out the reconstruction teams, the surge has still allowed the military to fashion its own advisory groups from battalion, brigade and division staffs. We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life.

Outside Baghdad, one of the biggest factors in the progress so far has been the efforts to decentralize power to the provinces and local governments. But more must be done. For example, the Iraqi National Police, which are controlled by the Interior Ministry, remain mostly a disaster. In response, many towns and neighborhoods are standing up local police forces, which generally prove more effective, less corrupt and less sectarian. The coalition has to force the warlords in Baghdad to allow the creation of neutral security forces beyond their control.

In the end, the situation in Iraq remains grave. In particular, we still face huge hurdles on the political front. Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation — or at least accommodation — are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines.

How much longer should American troops keep fighting and dying to build a new Iraq while Iraqi leaders fail to do their part? And how much longer can we wear down our forces in this mission? These haunting questions underscore the reality that the surge cannot go on forever. But there is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008.

Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings.

I think that it is good to see that we are getting some good news, from a very balanced point of view. The only thing I might disagree with this article is the level of motoviation from the military, I don't think that it was low in 2005. I was there and I didn't think that it was

But all in all, some news with lots of questions still to answer.

[Thorgrim]

Nice anecdotes, does seriously no one remember hearing this shit several times...in 2004, in 2005, in 2006...

[6SpeedTA95]

Great post in a tumultuous time for our military and our Iraqi operations.

It is definately good to see some good news on this especially from a source that has been so critical in the past. I think we need to make the Iraqi's stand on their own and so far I have not been overly impressed with what I've seen. Having said that we do not see it all, in fact all we really see here are the negatives. Which makes the publication of this piece all the more important.

[ballz2wallz]

This is the same guy that was against the war after it started going 'bad'.

[Thorgrim]

Originally Posted by 6SpeedTA95

Great post in a tumultuous time for our military and our Iraqi operations.

It is definately good to see some good news on this especially from a source that has been so critical in the past. I think we need to make the Iraqi's stand on their own and so far I have not been overly impressed with what I've seen. Having said that we do not see it all, in fact all we really see here are the negatives. Which makes the publication of this piece all the more important.

I didn't think you were a NY Times fan

[ballz2wallz]

Originally Posted by Thorgrim

I didn't think you were a NY Times fan

He's probably a fan of teh truth, no matter where it comes from.

This guy went over to Iraq and formed his opinion, something most people who are against the war haven't done. That includes you.

[6SpeedTA95]

Originally Posted by Thorgrim

I didn't think you were a NY Times fan

I'm not, not hardly.

[kinggovernor]

Originally Posted by Thorgrim

Nice anecdotes, does seriously no one remember hearing this shit several times...in 2004, in 2005, in 2006...

in 2005 the Iraqi Security Forces were nothing more than tag alongs for our patrols. Al Anbar province was also the most dangerous place in Iraq.

Both situations have been reserved, do you not think that is progress?

[Thorgrim]

Originally Posted by 6SpeedTA95

I'm not, not hardly.

I just find the selective praise to be funny

Why would a newspaper which just called for a pullout of Iraq, air a piece which goes directly against that? Unless they were an objective organization that tries to show both sides, not an evil liberal conspiracy

[motivez]

Originally Posted by ballz2wallz

He's probably a fan of teh truth, no matter where it comes from.

What makes you think this is the truth more than any other New York Times op-ed piece? Because you agree with it's conclusion?

[Thorgrim]

Originally Posted by motivez

What makes you think this is the truth more than any other New York Times op-ed piece? Because you agree with it's conclusion?

Bingo

[kinggovernor]

Originally Posted by motivez

What makes you think this is the truth more than any other New York Times op-ed piece? Because you agree with it's conclusion?

I give it more weight because they are so negative about Bush and discuss frankly how dangerous Iraq was before.

[6SpeedTA95]

Originally Posted by kinggovernor

I give it more weight because they are so negative about Bush and discuss frankly how dangerous Iraq was before.

Thats my view as well.

I dunno that I would agree with all of their conclusions regarding military operations in the region as a result of their trip but it is good to read their thoughts instead of the same ol' same ol.

[ballz2wallz]

Originally Posted by motivez

What makes you think this is the truth more than any other New York Times op-ed piece? Because you agree with it's conclusion?

Because he went over there? And he was adamently against the Iraq war before this? Why would he change his tune?

[kinggovernor]

Originally Posted by 6SpeedTA95

Thats my view as well.

I dunno that I would agree with all of their conclusions regarding military operations in the region as a result of their trip but it is good to read their thoughts instead of the same ol' same ol.

thanks for the rep point

[RMNIXON]

I give them credit for publishing it. I think many people were confused about the recent stories concerning benchmarks not being met. They were about the Iraqi government goals, not our military operations. The old notion that this is just a game of Mole in the Hole is not so true anymore. We have plugged up many of the Holes and are working on even more of em.

[motivez]

Are we talking about the same Ken Pollack that wrote the book "The Threating Storm: The case for invading Iraq" and then changed his mind once he saw what a clusterfuck it was?

[ballz2wallz]

Originally Posted by motivez

Are we talking about the same Ken Pollack that wrote the book "The Threating Storm: The case for invading Iraq" and then changed his mind once he saw what a clusterfuck it was?

Yes. He then went around the nation preaching about how bad it was and how much he was against it.

Now, he's changed his mind again, after seeing that we might actually be doing some good over there.

What do you know, a man that considers the evidence and forms an opinion. Isn't that what the liberals of LL have been wanting for so long, instead of someone that just spouts the regular mantra of their particular party?

[6SpeedTA95]

Originally Posted by motivez

Are we talking about the same Ken Pollack that wrote the book "The Threating Storm: The case for invading Iraq" and then changed his mind once he saw what a clusterfuck it was?

I believe so

[motivez]

Yeah, he's an Iraq war cheerleader.